




[ProdCon]

Bradley Geldenhuys - Hacking IoT Devices

What is an IoT device

The **Internet of things (IoT)** is a system of interrelated computing devices, mechanical and digital machines provided with unique identifiers (UIDs) and the ability to transfer data over a network without requiring human-to-human or human-to-computer interaction.



Therefore an IoT device is a sensor on that network that transmits data to another device

How do they communicate



WiFi/Ethernet



Bluetooth Low
Energy



Radio
Frequency



Zigbee / Z-
Wave



NFC / RFID

WiFi/Ethernet



2.4GHZ and
5GHZ



TCP/UDP



IP Address



Router

Bluetooth BLE

- ▶ Bluetooth (Classic) VS BLE
- ▶ BLE = Bluetooth Low Energy
- ▶ Completely different protocols not interchangeable
- ▶ sleeps between connections (10x less power)
- ▶ connects super fast
- ▶ smaller packets
- ▶ 2.4Ghz
- ▶ Peripheral device and Central Device
- ▶ MESH Network capability
- ▶ Smart Watches and sensors
- ▶ Bluetooth 4.0 Nano USB Adapter

Radio Frequency - RF

- ▶ 433 MHz and 315 MHz
- ▶ Peripheral device and Central Device
- ▶ Sensors, Remotes, Gates, Doors
- ▶ HackRF One - Great Scott Gadgets
- ▶ Sonoff RF Bridge
- ▶ Broadlink IR + RF
- ▶ SDR - Software Defined Radio


What about Zigbee and Z- Wave

- ▶ Z-Wave 908.42 MHz ZigBee 2.4Ghz
- ▶ ZigBee Is an Open Standard; Z-Wave Is Not (Owned by Silicon labs)
- ▶ ZigBee requires less power
- ▶ Z-Wave has a further distance advantage 10m-20m vs 90m-100m (Indoors)
- ▶ Zigbee 250 kbit/s vs 100 kbit/s
- ▶ Zigbee uses 128-bit keys Z-Wave uses Security 2 secure key exchange using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
- ▶ Zigbee 65000 vs Z-Wave network can consist of up to 232 devices
- ▶ Sonoff Zigbee Bridge / Hubitat Elevation Home Automation Hub

- ▶ **(MQ Telemetry Transport or Message Queuing Telemetry Transport)** is an open OASIS and ISO standard (ISO/IEC 20922) lightweight, publish-subscribe network protocol that transports messages between devices. The protocol usually runs over TCP/IP; however, any network protocol that provides ordered, lossless, bi-directional connections can support MQTT. It is designed for connections with remote locations where a "small code footprint" is required or the network bandwidth is limited.
- ▶ Broker Client Relationship
- ▶ Messages are sent in Topics
- ▶ Topics are subscribed to
- ▶ Connect, Disconnect, Publish
- ▶ No encryption on auth
- ▶ A lot of anonymous servers
- ▶ Wireshark / Mosquito Broker /MQTTLens


Taking a closer look at MQTT

How does a smart home / office work



Identifying the Attack Surface

- ▶ Remote Access to Local Devices
 - Shodan
 - Google
 - Metasploit
 - Camerarader (RTSP)
- ▶ Local Access via RF / Zigbee / BLE / NFC / RFID
 - Remember those apps and devices I mentioned earlier 😊
- ▶ Local Access via WiFi / Ethernet
 - Aircrack-ng
- ▶ Shared Subnet
 - Wireshark
 - NMAP



Brute Force

Home Assistant Login



Home Assistant

You're about to give <http://10.0.0.10:8123/> access to your Home Assistant instance.

Logging in with **Home Assistant Local**.

Invalid username or password

Username

admin

Password

•••••



NEXT

Notifications



Login attempt failed

Login attempt or request with invalid authentication from 10.0.0.130

17 seconds ago

DISMISS

Brute Force

RTSP with docker run -t
ullaakut/cameradar

```
docker run --net=host -t ullaakut/cameradar -t localhost -p 8554 -T 3s -s 3 -d
Loading credentials...ok
  > Loading credentials dictionary from path "/app/dictionaries/credentials.json"
  > Loaded 14 usernames and 25 passwords
Loading routes...ok
  > Loading routes dictionary from path "/app/dictionaries/routes"
  > Loaded 165 routes
Scanning the network...ok
  > Found 1 RTSP streams
Attacking routes of 1 streams...ok
Attempting to detect authentication methods of 1 streams...ok
  > Stream rtsp://:@127.0.0.1:8554/live.sdp uses basic authentication method
Attacking credentials of 1 streams...ok
Validating that streams are accessible...ok
▶ Device RTSP URL:      rtsp://admin:admin@127.0.0.1:8554/live.sdp
  Available:           ✓
  IP address:          127.0.0.1
  RTSP port:           8554
  Auth type:           basic
  Username:            admin
  Password:            admin
  RTSP route:          /live.sdp

✓ Successful attack: 1 device was accessed↵
```

Sniffing

▷ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 64008 (64008), Dst Port: 1883 (1883), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 39

△ MQ Telemetry Transport Protocol

△ Connect Command

△ 0001 0000 = Header Flags: 0x10 (Connect Command)

0001 = Message Type: Connect Command (1)

.... 0... = DUP Flag: Not set

.... .00. = QOS Level: Fire and Forget (0)

.... ...0 = Retain: Not set

Msg Len: 37

Protocol Name: MQIsdp

Version: 3

△ 1100 0010 = Connect Flags: 0xc2

1... = User Name Flag: Set

.1.. = Password Flag: Set

..0. = Will Retain: Not set

...0 0... = QOS Level: Fire and Forget (0)

.... .0.. = Will Flag: Not set

.... ..1. = Clean Session Flag: Set

.... ...0 = (Reserved): Not set

Keep Alive: 30

Client ID: mqtt

User Name: mqtt-spy

Password: mqtt123

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Message from publishing client

Message from broker to
g client




Exploits

Taplock BLE Exploit


Authentication Bypass

/cgi-bin/anony/mjpg.cgi



Reverse Engineer

- Firmware
- .bin
- Binwalk



Takeaways

- ▶ Tasmota all the IoT things
- ▶ Secure Home Assistant and use the Multi Factor Authentication
- ▶ Force Authentication on the MQTT Broker
- ▶ HTTPS all the things / DuckDNS and Lets Encrypt (Don't use personal naming)
- ▶ Virtual Tunnelling over Firewall Rules
- ▶ Don't use the same username and password for all items
- ▶ Update firmware and software regularly
- ▶ VLAN IoT devices / Zero Trust Network Design
- ▶ Create a separate SSID for IoT Devices

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Thank You